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Cabining Judicial Discretion over Forensic Evidence
with a New Special Relevance Rule
Emma F.E. Shoucair*
Modern forensic evidence suffers from a number of flaws, including insuffi-
cient scientific grounding, exaggerated testimony, lack of uniform best prac-
tices, and an inefficacious standard for admission that regularly allows judges 
to admit scientifically unsound evidence. This Note discusses these problems, 
lays out the current landscape of forensic science reform, and suggests the ad-
dition of a new special relevance rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence (and 
similar rules in state evidence codes). This proposed rule would cabin judicial 
discretion to admit non-DNA forensic evidence by barring prosecutorial intro-
duction of such evidence in criminal trials absent a competing defense expert 
or a high showing of scientific viability.
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Introduction
On January 20, 1980, Santae A. Tribble was convicted of armed robbery 
and the felony murder of a taxi driver he had never met.1 He spent the next 
twenty-eight years in prison, where he contracted HIV and hepatitis.2
Mr. Tribble’s conviction was based on testimony3 from the FBI Crime Labor-
atory that there was a high degree of similarity between his hair and hair found 
at the scene.4 But, in 2012, mitochondrial DNA testing revealed that Mr. Trib-
ble could not have contributed any of the hairs found at the scene.5 One of the 
hairs the FBI had matched to Mr. Tribble had come, in fact, from a dog.6 In 
February 2016, a judge ordered the District of Columbia to pay Mr. Tribble 
over $13 million in damages.7
In 2015, the Justice Department and the FBI admitted that 26 of the 28 
examiners in the FBI Crime Laboratory had given exaggerated testimony from 
1972 to 1999;8 these examiners had overstated to juries the actual probative 
value of hair-match analysis.9 Of the 268 trials with overstated hair-match ev-
idence examined by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
and the Innocence Project, 14 of the defendants “sentenced to death . . . [had] 
been executed or died in prison.”10 During those trials, there would have been 
no reason for the judges, prosecution counsel, or defense counsel to suspect 
they were being presented with exaggerated testimony. And the problem is 
1. See Santae Tribble, Nat’l Registry of Exonerations (July 3, 2012) (updated July 
19, 2016), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3926
[https://perma.cc/WH83-98C8].
2. Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Orders D.C. to Pay $13.2 Million in Wrongful FBI Hair Convic-
tion Case, Wash. Post (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/
judge-orders-dc-to-pay-132-million-in-wrongful-fbi-hair-conviction-case/2016/02/28/
da82e178-dcde-11e5-81ae-7491b9b9e7df_story.html [https://perma.cc/3CME-EAAZ].
3. The D.C. Superior Court order granting Tribble’s certificate of innocence notes that 
the expert’s testimony was “critical to the jury’s decision.” Certificate of Actual Innocence at 1, 
United States v. Tribble, No. 78 FEL 4160 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
4. Hsu, supra note 2.
5. Santae Tribble, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Tribble v. District of Columbia, 144 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 669, 680 (D.C. Super. Ct. 
2016), amended by 2016 WL 3405166, at *1 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2016).
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broader than hair analysis: since 1989, 524 exonerations nationwide involved 
false or misleading forensic evidence.11
Forensic science is defined as “the application of scientific principles and 
techniques to matters of criminal justice especially as relating to the collection, 
examination, and analysis of physical evidence.”12 The public’s relationship 
with forensic science is complicated, and forensic evidence has become para-
mount in criminal trials. Many jurors have come to expect forensic evidence 
in criminal trials,13 even though most trials involve none.14 Some research sug-
gests that this so-called “CSI Effect” makes jurors less willing to convict in the 
absence of forensic evidence.15 As a result, investigators will sometimes per-
form unnecessary tests in the field simply to have something “scientific” to 
present to a jury.16 These tendencies underscore the importance of ensuring 
only accurate and reliable forensic evidence reaches a jury: as the Supreme 
Court noted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., “[e]xpert evi-
dence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in 
evaluating it.”17
Part I of this Note describes the current federal evidentiary framework for 
admitting expert scientific testimony. Part II discusses the problems with fo-
rensic science in criminal trials: the lack of foundational scientific validity, the 
lack of any rigorous system of laboratory accreditation or certification system 
11. % Exonerations by Contributing Factor, Nat’l Registry Exonerations, https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx
[https://perma.cc/HY3N-ULJT].
12. Forensic Science, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/
forensic%20science [https://perma.cc/E4HN-BX4T].
13. Donald E. Shelton, The ‘CSI Effect’: Does It Really Exist?, Nat’l Inst. Just. (Mar. 17, 
2008), https://www.nij.gov/journals/259/pages/csi-effect.aspx [https://perma.cc/G9DK-
MMVC] (indicating that 46% of jurors expect to see scientific evidence in every criminal case, 
22% expect to see DNA evidence in every criminal case, 36% expect to see fingerprint evidence 
in every criminal case, and 32% expect to see ballistic evidence in every criminal case).
14. For an estimate of cases in which forensic evidence exists, see, for example, Keith 
O’Brien, The Case Against Evidence, Bos. Globe (Nov. 7, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/bos-
tonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/11/07/the_case_against_evidence/ (on file with the Michigan Law 
Review) (detailing a survey of homicide cases in which only 13.5% featured physical evidence, 
with DNA evidence in only 4.5% of the cases).
15. Shelton, supra note 13.
16. Arun Rath, Is the ‘CSI Effect’ Influencing Courtrooms?, NPR (Feb. 5, 2011, 7:30 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/06/133497696/is-the-csi-effect-influencing-courtrooms (on file 
with the Michigan Law Review).
17. 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)). The President’s
Council of Advisors in Science and Technology’s (PCAST) 2016 report emphasizes the uniquely 
dangerous nature of forensic testimony—jurors largely lack the knowledge and ability to evalu-
ate expert forensic testimony independently and are likely to attach high probative value to a 
“match” (which for many forensic tests are subjective). President’s Council of Advisors on 
Sci. & Tech., Exec. Office of the President, Report to the President: Forensic Science 
in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods 45 
(2016) [hereinafter PCAST Report].
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for individual practitioners, the institutional barriers to improving the system, 
and the problematic ways in which judges and juries interact with forensic 
evidence. Part III proposes a new special relevance rule excluding non-DNA 
forensic evidence in criminal trials under certain circumstances absent a sig-
nificant showing of scientific validity. This new rule would protect the integ-
rity of the legal process in the face of inaccurate evidence. Finally, Part IV ad-
dresses potential counterarguments to the adoption of this new special 
relevance rule.
I. Forensic Evidence in Federal Courts
The admissibility of forensic evidence, presented through expert testi-
mony, is governed by two rules in federal court: Federal Rules of Evidence 702 
and 403.18 These rules often have analogues in state evidence codes19 and are 
motivated in part by concerns about the high degree of deference juries often 
give to expert testimony.20 To prevent juries from over-valuing expert opin-
ions, care must be taken to ensure the testimony juries hear is based on reliable 
and valid methodologies.
Rule 702 governs when expert testimony may be admitted:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 
facts of the case.21
This version of Rule 702 is the legislative adoption of Daubert’s expert testi-
mony admission standards.22 Daubert makes judges the “gatekeepers” of the 
courtroom: away from the jury, a judge determines whether the expert 
18. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Fed. R. Evid. 403.
19. For example, Pa. R. Evid. 702, which varies slightly from its federal counterpart in 
requiring that the “expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [be] beyond that 
possessed by the average layperson,” and Pa. R. Evid. 403, which, in contrast to Fed. R. Evid.
403, discussed infra, only requires that the probative value be outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice (eliminating “substantially”).
20. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
21. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
22. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588; see Gary Edmond et al., Admissibility Compared: The Re-
ception of Incriminating Expert Evidence (i.e., Forensic Science) in Four Adversarial Jurisdictions,
3 U. Denv. Crim. L. Rev. 31, 39 (2013) (noting that the revision to Rule 702 in 2000 was made 
“to make the need for ‘reliability’ explicit” in light of the opinion in Daubert).
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testimony can be admitted. In making this determination, the judge must as-
sess whether the information the expert will convey is relevant and helpful to 
the factfinder, as well as whether that testimony is the product of a valid set of 
methods.23 Daubert presents a nonexhaustive list of factors for judges to con-
sider when conducting this validity inquiry: testing, peer review, error rates, 
existence/maintenance of standards, and general acceptance.24 This set of fac-
tors replaces the old inquiry into “general acceptance” by the scientific com-
munity from Frye v. United States.25 These factors are instructive as to whether 
proffered expert scientific or technical testimony is “junk” or not. The Su-
preme Court expanded on Daubert in two subsequent cases, General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner26 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.27 Joiner established the 
standard of review for Daubert hearings as abuse of discretion,28 and Kumho
extended the scope of Daubert to include nonscientific knowledge, including 
“technical” or “other specialized knowledge.”29
The ruling in Daubert was not unanimous. In his dissent, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist expressed discomfort with the amount of authority given to judges 
to exclude evidence on the basis of their own nonexpert scientific fluency: “I 
do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsi-
bility in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. 
But I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to 
become amateur scientists in order to perform that role.”30 It appears, how-
ever, that how the rule is formulated does not make a huge difference in what 
evidence gets admitted in certain contexts. States have adopted Daubert to 
varying degrees. Some states have adopted it formally, while others maintain 
the older Frye standard;31 still others have created a hybrid standard.32 In the 
23. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93.
24. Id. at 593–94.
25. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
26. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
27. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
28. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141.
29. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147–48.
30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600–01 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting).
31. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishing the criteria for 
admission as general acceptance within the applicable scientific community, a standard much 
more deferential to the relevant scientific communities and entailing less active judicial exami-
nation of the evidence itself).
32. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and 
Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453, § 2 (2011) (noting that 25 states have 
formally adopted Daubert as the standard for admissibility, while fifteen states plus the District 
of Columbia still use Frye; six states combine Daubert factors into Frye, and four states have 
unique tests).
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end, junk science appears to reach juries with similar frequencies in state 
courts regardless of the formal rule.33
In addition to the different developmental paths seen between federal and 
state courts in the application of Daubert, there is also a marked divergence 
between civil and criminal contexts. In criminal trials, which are rife with fo-
rensic evidence and are the focus of the present inquiry, defense attorneys reg-
ularly fail to bring Daubert challenges.34 When they do bring these challenges, 
they usually lose.35 It is sometimes said that a rigorous cross-examination—
the very heart of the adversarial process—will expose any junk forensic evi-
dence.36 In practice, however, this has not been borne out. In instances where 
fraud or misconduct on the part of testifying experts was later uncovered, not 
once did cross-examination bring the conduct to light.37 If the adversarial sys-
tem of nonscientists is not in practice discovering fraud in criminal contexts, 
it is unlikely to discover a lack of underlying peer review, a lack of general 
scientific acceptance, or a lack of falsifiability. If the point of Daubert was to 
ensure the accuracy of admitted expert testimony, it has not succeeded.38
More generally, Rule 403 lays out the general standard for when any evi-
dence can be excluded: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the fol-
lowing: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”39
33. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study 
of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 Va. L. Rev. 471, 482–90 (2005) (discussing the evolution 
of state court judges’ attitudes toward questionable scientific evidence in toxic tort contexts, sug-
gesting the metric of the frequency with which tort defendants in state court remove to federal 
court as a way of showing the differing treatment of scientific evidence on the federal and state 
levels). In state level civil litigation, “the choice between a Frye and Daubert standard does not 
make any practical difference.” Id. at 475.
34. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards 
of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 99, 104 (2000) (describing a survey of federal 
appellate cases and district cases, as well as state cases that showed the rapid increase in expert 
challenges in civil cases after Daubert as compared to a much smaller increase in criminal cases).
35. Id. at 105–08 (showing that in criminal cases on appeal in a federal court, “defense-
proffered expertise was found to be properly excluded 83% of the time . . . and government prof-
fered expertise was found only once to be so undependable as to require exclusion”); id. at 109–
10 (showing that the statistics are similar at the federal district court level).
36. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595–96 (1993) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
37. Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Sug-
gestions for Reform, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health, S107, S109 (2005).
38. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 2018) (manuscript at 3–6) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). On the other hand, 
in federal civil cases, the results of Daubert have been “decidedly pro-defendant” and have “em-
powered defendants to exclude certain types of scientific evidence, substantially improving their 
chances of obtaining summary judgment and thereby avoiding what are perceived to be unpre-
dictable and often plaintiff-friendly juries.” Cheng & Yoon, supra note 33, at 473.
39. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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Analyzing evidence under Rule 403 entails balancing the probative value of 
the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice to the party opposing its ad-
mission (generally, in criminal trials, the defendant). Early attempts to exclude 
questionable forensic evidence, such as polygraph examinations, went 
through Rule 403.40 Highly prejudicial expert testimony can still be excluded 
through 403 balancing even if it survives Rule 702. Indeed, in several in-
stances, Congress has determined some types of evidence fail 403 balancing as 
a matter of law (that is, “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 
danger of . . . unfair prejudice”)41 and are per se excluded for certain pur-
poses.42 It is against the backdrop of Rules 702 and 403 that this Note examines 
the substantive problems with expert forensic evidence.
II. Problems with Forensic Evidence
A. Unreliable Tests and Unreliable Testimony
Many of the common forensic tests used to convict criminal defendants 
are not backed up by scientific data, which ought to raise concerns about ad-
missibility under 702. The lack of foundational scientific data for many foren-
sic techniques has garnered considerable attention, both in popular media and 
in legal scholarship.43 DNA matching, “a fortuitous by-product of cutting-
edge science,”44 is the gold standard for forensic evidence.45 Notably, and in 
contrast to many of the other commonly used forensic tests, DNA testing was 
not developed for the purpose of use in court. It was subjected to rigorous 
peer-reviewed analysis in the scientific community to determine its validity, 
and only then was it applied to criminal proceedings (and even then only after 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 730 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the 
district court had not abused its discretion in excluding polygraph evidence on the grounds that 
it was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 
1216–17 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that polygraph testing could be properly excluded under Rule 
403 as overly prejudicial even if admissible under Rule 702).
41. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
42. See infra Section III.C.
43. For an up-to-date survey of the legal literature and comments by courts expressing 
dissatisfaction with the scientific validity of commonly used forensic tests, see Giannelli, supra
note 38; see also LastWeekTonight, Forensic Science: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO),
YouTube (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScmJvmzDcG0 [https://perma.cc/
R553-YL33].
44. Comm. on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Scis. Cmty., Nat’l Research 
Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 133 
(2009) [hereinafter NAS Report].
45. “[E]minent scientists contributed their expertise to ensuring that DNA evidence of-
fered in a courtroom would be valid and reliable.” Id.
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a fierce debate).46 As a result, its probative value is very high, although (mostly 
human) errors still happen.47
In these ways, DNA is an outlier. Other common forensics tests were de-
veloped specifically for use in criminal investigation,48 and their validity and 
accuracy have not been confirmed through peer-reviewed studies. For exam-
ple, the FBI recently recognized the need for foundational studies establishing 
the validity and error rates for latent fingerprint analysis, a technique that has 
been in use since 1800 without any serious verification of its accuracy.49 The 
FBI’s study, just one of two studies to date that have attempted to assess error 
rates, suggests that errors may appear in one out of every 306 cases,50 a rate 
that is very much out of line with our cultural intuitions about fingerprint ac-
curacy. Without being explicitly informed of this reality, juries will continue 
to operate as though fingerprint matching is infallible. A summary of com-
mon forensic tests can be found below:
46. For an overview of the use of DNA evidence in court (starting in 1986 after its discov-
ery and initial scientific vetting in 1953), see Lisa Calandro et al., Evolution of DNA Evidence for 
Crime Solving—A Judicial and Legislative History, Forensic Mag. (Jan. 6, 2005, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.forensicmag.com/article/2005/01/evolution-dna-evidence-crime-solving-judicial-
and-legislative-history [https://perma.cc/C5Q4-TFJM]. For a discussion of the so-called “DNA 
wars,” see, for example, Gina Kolata, Two Chief Rivals in the Battle Over DNA Evidence Now 
Agree on Its Use, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/27/us/two-chief-
rivals-in-the-battle-over-dna-evidence-now-agree-on-its-use.html (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review).
47. Kolata, supra note 46.
48. Often, the tests themselves are developed by laboratories affiliated with prosecutorial 
offices, raising the issue of partiality. See, for example, the controversial EDTA test developed 
on short notice by the FBI Crime Laboratory for use in Stephen Avery’s trial in Netflix’s popular 
Making a Murderer. Amelia McDonnell-Parry, Experts Offer Concerns Over Forensic Testing in 
‘Making a Murderer’ Case, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/cul-
ture/news/experts-offer-concerns-over-forensic-testing-in-making-a-murderer-case-20160414
[https://perma.cc/28U7-HLXV].
49. PCAST Report, supra note 17, at 101.
50. Id.
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Table 1: Comparison of Forensic Tests51
X52 X53 X54 X55 X56 X57
51. Unless otherwise noted, this information has been taken from the NAS Report, supra
note 44, at 127–83.
52. Objective tests are tests in which a definitive match between two samples is possible—
for example, DNA collected from a crime scene and DNA collected from a suspect. Subjective 
tests, on the other hand, are tests in which a human tester makes a judgment call as to the simi-
larity of two samples—for example, the visual characteristics of a hair found at a crime scene and 
a hair collected from a suspect.
53. Note that it is difficult to calculate error rates without a discussion of what type of 
error is being discussed; errors can include subjective examiner error, instrumentation error vs. 
actual statistical error inherent in the method of testing itself. This distinction is generally be-
yond the scope of the current discussion.
54. PCAST Report, supra note 17, at 72.
55. Id. at 101.
56. Id. at 111.
57. Id. at 84
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As the table above demonstrates, most forensic tests are not objective or 
particularly scientific, creating a mismatch between jury expectations and re-
ality. This mismatch, especially when considered in conjunction with the dis-
cussion of accreditation below, demonstrates the difficulties inherent in using 
scientifically dubious subjective methods to convict defendants. The entire 
perceived value of forensic evidence is its objectivity and rigor: it is presented 
as science. The 2016 report by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology (PCAST) recommends abandoning bitemark analysis and 
hair match analysis (which it called “scientifically unacceptable”58) because 
the probability they will be developed into scientifically valid methods is very 
low. It also found shoeprint impression identification analysis to be lacking in 
scientific foundational validity.59 Yet despite the obvious and now well-publi-
cized flaws with these types of evidence, they are routinely admitted as evi-
dence in criminal trials.60
In addition to problems with the tests themselves, there are also issues 
with forensic experts’ trial testimony. Even the analysts at the FBI Crime La-
boratory are not immune from problematic testimony, as detailed by the 
Washington Post in 2015.61 A 2009 study found that in a sample of 156 ex-
onerees convicted using the testimony of forensic experts and later exonerated 
using DNA evidence, 60% of the cases included invalid forensic testimony—
implicating 72 analysts and 52 laboratories.62 The most common errors in the 
invalid forensic science testimony were incorrect use of population data (e.g.,
“only 5% of the population has red hair” when no data on the frequency of 
hair types exists)63 and overstatement of the probative value of forensic tests64
(e.g., the FBI’s use of hair match despite a lack of empirical evidence showing 
58. PCAST Report, supra note 17, at 121, 148.
59. See id. at 61–62, 117.
60. Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Note, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science Problem,
Note, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1532, 1536 (2017) (discussing possible reasons for judges continuing to 
admit forensic evidence).
61. See Hsu, supra note 8.
62. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrong-
ful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2009).
63. Id. at 9. The authors further subdivide this type of error into the following types: 
nonprobative evidence presented as probative, exculpatory evidence discounted, and inaccurate 
frequency or statistic presented. To illustrate this type of error, the authors point to a rape case 
in which the prosecution’s expert testified that the genetic material from a vaginal swab of the 
victim contained a genetic marker for blood type B (the defendant’s blood type), and stated that 
only 11% of Caucasians have type B blood, making it very likely that the defendant was the rapist. 
The expert failed to disclose, however, that the victim also had type B blood, and that the marker 
detected could have come exclusively from the victim and masked markers from the semen. Id.
at 17–18.
64. Id. at 9. The authors further subdivide this type of error into the following types: sta-
tistic provided without empirical support, non-numerical statements provided without empiri-
cal support, and conclusion that evidence originated from defendant. Id. at 18–19.
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its validity). The study also found systemic issues with the legal treatment of 
invalid forensic testimony:
Unfortunately, our criminal system may not be well situated to prevent un-
scientific testimony. The adversarial system largely failed to police the inva-
lid testimony during these trials. Defense counsel rarely cross-examined an-
alysts concerning invalid testimony and rarely retained experts, since courts 
routinely deny funding for defense experts. Prosecutors, moreover, pre-
sented erroneous accounts of the forensic evidence during closing argu-
ments. In a few cases in which the defense challenged invalid forensic sci-
ence, judges seldom provided relief. Courts do not typically review testimony 
after finding the underlying methodology reliable and permitting the foren-
sic analyst to take the stand.65
Garrett and Neufeld’s observation highlights the need for both scientific 
and legal reform. The forensic science community should strive for the most 
reliable and accurate data it can provide, and the legal system needs to do a 
better job policing the admission of inaccurate information.
B. Accreditation, Certification, and Best Practices
A separate set of problems with forensic science relates to the laboratories 
and analysts that carry out the testing. Forensic science laboratories are over-
whelmingly administered by law enforcement agencies, raising concerns 
about the potential for conflict between laboratory priorities of achieving the 
most accurate results and law enforcement priorities of achieving the greatest 
number of convictions.66 The National Academic Press (NAS) report names 
the independence of forensic laboratories as a priority for ensuring the scien-
tific integrity of forensic testimony.67
Lack of accreditation for forensic laboratories in most states is also a cause 
for concern. The NAS report notes:
Several commentators appearing before the committee noted that nearly an-
yone with a garage and some capital theoretically could open a forensics la-
boratory and start offering services. Although this might be a bit hyperbolic, 
the fact is that there are no requirements, except in a few states (New York, 
Oklahoma, and Texas), for forensics laboratories to meet specific standards 
for quality assurance or for practitioners to be certified according to an 
agreed set of standards.68
In addition to a lack of a uniform accreditation system (or even the existence 
of mandatory state-level accreditation in every state), there is likewise no uni-
form set of quality control or quality assurance standards.69 There is no system 
65. Id. at 10–11.
66. NAS Report, supra note 44, at 183–84.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 193.
69. Id. at 193–94.
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of federal oversight.70 The result is, unsurprisingly, uneven quality of labora-
tories.71
The problems do not end with the laboratories. Blind proficiency testing 
of individual examiners is recommended but often not required.72 There is no 
uniform system of individual certification; rather, different subdisciplines 
have their own certification processes, and “some certification organizations 
appear to lack stringent requirements.”73 The lack of a universal, rigorous 
standard for individual certifications raises special concerns, given that so 
much of forensic testimony is based on subjective testing in which the analyst 
makes visual matches.74 Confidence in the analysts providing the expert testi-
mony is essential, and there is currently no reliable system in place to warrant 
such confidence.
C. Barriers to Improvement
The 2009 NAS and the 2016 PCAST reports provide recommendations 
for improving the state of forensic science. The NAS report recommends re-
forms like the congressional establishment of an independent federal over-
sight body to promulgate standards and fund peer-reviewed research into re-
liability and error rates.75 It also recommends the establishment of accredited 
and independent laboratories, as well as the creation of standards for forensic 
analysts.76 The PCAST report recommends continuing scientific studies to 
shore up foundational validity and to convert subjective tests into objective 
ones.77 The authors of the report urge the judiciary to use scientific standards 
when weighing admission,78 implying they think judges are not currently do-
ing so.79
These recommendations shed light on the difficulties in achieving stand-
ardized reform.80 Congress has not created or funded an independent agency 
to address substandard forensic science, and it is unlikely to make it a priority 
in the near future. Certain legislative incentives cut against expecting action 
from Congress or state legislatures. Increasing the rigor of forensic science 
70. Id. Thus necessitating the NAS recommendation that Congress create an agency. See
infra note 75 and accompanying text.
71. NAS Report, supra note 44, at 194.
72. Id. at 207–08.
73. Id. at 209–10.
74. See supra Table 1.
75. NAS Report, supra note 44, at 19.
76. Id. at 190–91, 214–15.
77. PCAST Report, supra note 17, at 128–29.
78. Id. at 142–45.
79. Id.
80. See generally Jessica D. Gabel, Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the Ground 
Up, 104 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 283 (2014).
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could be considered defendant friendly, and elected representatives are often 
reluctant to seem “soft on crime.”81 These issues also exist on the state legisla-
tive level.82 There was pushback from law enforcement agencies to the 2016 
PCAST report before the report had even been released,83 so there is reason to 
believe that law enforcement groups oppose some of the proposed reforms.
This is not to say that no progress has been made. At the end of his ad-
ministration, President Obama detailed the advances made in criminal justice 
reform, including the establishment of the National Commission on Forensic 
Science, which recommended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) be re-
quired to use accredited labs whenever practicable, and increased research 
into the foundational validity of many of the common forensic tests discussed 
above.84 But the Obama administration faced criticism for not requiring fed-
eral law enforcement agencies to adopt the recommendations of the 2016 
PCAST report.85 While recognition that tests like hair match are not scientif-
ically valid is a step in the right direction, no legislative or executive action was 
taken under President Obama to prevent the use of such tests.
However lackluster advocates found the Obama administration’s push to-
ward reform, movement has trended in the opposite direction under Presi-
dent Trump. Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s decision in April of 2016 to al-
low the National Commission on Forensic Science to expire has “rais[ed] 
concerns among defense attorneys and other advocates about the future of the 
Justice Department’s work in that arena.”86 Deputy Attorney General Rod 
Rosenstein announced a new working group “whose top missions will be set-
ting uniform standards for how experts testify about such evidence and creat-
ing a program to monitor the accuracy of forensic testimony” as well as im-
proving the resources of crime labs.87 The move, however, has been met with 
criticism because the working group will be internal to the DOJ and not inde-
pendent, and therefore tied to prosecutorial interests.88 Additionally, 
81. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 
505, 509, 529–33 (2001).
82. Id.
83. Del Quentin Wilber, White House Panel Expected to Issue Report Critical of Some Fo-
rensic Evidence in Criminal Cases, L.A. Times (Sept. 1, 2016, 4:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-council-forensic-evidence-20160831-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/LMY9-
WLS6] (“Jim Pasco, executive director of the National Fraternal Order of Police, was briefed on 
the recommendations and said it appeared to be based on a ‘half-baked model’ that ‘calls into 
question technologies’ that have long been used in court.”).
84. Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Re-
form, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 811, 860–61 (2017).
85. Radley Balko, Obama’s Rhetoric on Forensics Is at Odds with His Record, Wash. Post
(Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/01/05/obamas-rhet-
oric-on-forensics-is-at-odds-with-his-record/ [https://perma.cc/7GWR-Q743].
86. Sadie Gurman, Justice Department Considers Revamp of Federal Standards for Foren-
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Rosenstein has said that “[w]e must use forensic analysis carefully, but we 
must continue to use it . . . . We should not exclude reliable forensic analy-
sis,”89 seemingly without acknowledgment that the analysis is, in many cases, 
simply not reliable.
The scientific state of affairs outlined here is alarming. The practical dif-
ficulty of achieving meaningful outright reform through Congress, as well as 
the slow or nonexistent movement by the executive branch, underscores the 
need for changes in how the legal system regulates the admission of forensic 
evidence.
D. Judges, Juries, and Daubert
We now turn to examining a “puzzling and consequential question”:
“[w]hy didn’t the Supreme Court’s ‘junk science’ decision, Daubert[], prevent 
or restrict the admissibility of testimony based on flawed forensic tech-
niques?”90
Daubert instructed judges to engage with the science as science (through, 
for example, an evaluation of peer review) on an individualized basis, not just 
to inquire as to whether a community of practitioners accepted it.91 The fact 
that little difference can be detected in evidence admission in states that have 
shifted from the Frye standard to the Daubert standard92 perhaps indicates 
that judges are not actually applying the scrutiny now required by Rule 702.
Some scholars have suggested that judges resist the admissibility stand-
ards presented in Daubert, even in the civil context. Federal judges will some-
times cite to cases that pre-date Daubert or admit evidence that does not meet 
the criteria of Rule 702 and say the jury is to evaluate the “weight” of the tes-
timony.93 There is also some evidence that judges do not want to play the role 
of gatekeeper of scientific evidence. One judge even noted that “the process of 
dealing with expert scientific testimony” was like “being ‘hit . . . between your 
eyes with a four-by-four.’ ”94 Few judges have scientific backgrounds; it is 
89. Id.
90. Giannelli, supra note 38 (footnote omitted).
91. Compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (noting 
that “the trial judge must determine . . . whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid”), with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
(articulating the test as whether “the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”).
92. See Chen & Yoon, supra note 33, at 498–99.
93. David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 27, 54–55 (2013); see Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 F.3d 11 
(1st Cir. 2011).
94. Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s Legacy 
of Confusion, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1085, 1096 (2006) (quoting Jon Y. Ikegami, Objection: 
Hearsay—Why Hearsay-Like Thinking Is a Flawed Proxy for Scientific Validity in the Daubert
“Gatekeeper” Standard, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 705, 711 (2000)).
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likely difficult for them to be the gatekeepers for information they do not have 
the tools to understand. The situation may be even more complicated: some 
evidence suggests that judges overall apply greater rigor to expert testimony 
offered by criminal defendants and civil litigants than they do to that offered 
by prosecutors.95 In other words, it’s not that judges cannot adequately evalu-
ate the science, it’s that in certain contexts they have incentives not to.
Other explanations for a judicial willingness to admit evidence that 
should be excluded under Rule 702 and Daubert in criminal trials include the 
fact that many judges are former prosecutors, that judges in many states must 
run “ ’tough on crime’ elections,”96 that defense attorneys fail to object to pros-
ecution expert witnesses, and that judges generally have concerns about with-
holding evidence from juries.97
Lack of judicial rigor in applying the Daubert standard is especially con-
cerning in criminal trials where prosecutors introduce questionable forensic 
evidence; the introduction of forensic evidence itself may be prejudicial, since 
juries are possibly predisposed to accepting it regardless of its actual scientific
validity. In recent years, the media has often discussed the so-called “CSI Ef-
fect,” which purports to make prosecutors’ jobs harder because the public has 
now come to expect forensic evidence and will not convict without it.98 But 
there is also some data suggestive of a somewhat different effect: the public 
has come to view forensic science as generally accurate.99 This uncritical ac-
ceptance is a troubling development, and it is all the more important that un-
sound scientific evidence be excluded before it reaches a jury. Doing so re-
quires reexamination of the admission standard in criminal trials.
III. Toward a Solution: A New Special Relevance Rule
There are a number of productive avenues for fixing the complex set of 
problems presented by junk forensic science, many of them involving scien-
tists, law enforcement officers, lawyers, and legislators. These potential solu-
tions are outlined above in the discussion of the NAS and PCAST reports.100
The actual scientific research necessary to develop these methods into rigor-
ous tests with probative value must be conducted by scientists, federal stand-
ards must be put into place to ensure consistency across jurisdictions, and the 
95. Damon-Moore, supra note 60, at 1535, 1535 n.15; see also Neufeld, supra note 37, at 
S109.
96. Damon-Moore, supra note 60, at 1536.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Brian Dakss, ‘The CSI Effect’, CBS (Mar. 21, 2005, 10:47 AM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/the-csi-effect/ [https://perma.cc/7MXS-5CDL] (noting that jurors in 
the Robert Blake murder trial refused to convict based on eyewitness testimony, and quoting a 
juror as saying “[i]f [the prosecutor] would have had [blood spatter or gunshot residue evidence], 
that would have meant that he was guilty”).
99. Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and 
Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1335, 1354–55 (2009).
100. See supra Section II.C.
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development and execution of forensic tests must take place free from prose-
cutorial influence. These solutions, however, will all require time and funding, 
and scientifically questionable evidence should not continue to be admitted in 
the meantime.
Other strategies for allaying the risks of misleading evidence involve en-
couraging defense attorneys to bring Daubert (and state-level equivalent) 
challenges to any prosecution expert presenting forensic evidence. States can 
be encouraged to enact or improve wrongful conviction recovery statutes. 
Eighteen states have no such statutes,101 and increasing the recovery amounts 
in the states that do have them will disincentivize the use of unscientific evi-
dence. Given the political constraints on passing legislation perceived as de-
fendant friendly,102 and because public defenders in many jurisdictions carry 
huge caseloads,103 increasing expectations placed on the defense would not be 
productive. Because of the difficulties inherent in implementing these solu-
tions, the most efficient way to minimize the damage junk science can do to 
the legal system is to exclude it, at least until there exists adequate scientific 
data demonstrating validity and reliability for each individual method.
A. Evidence Code Generally
Our evidence codes tend to be liberal—they trust juries and overall favor 
jury evaluation of evidence. Rule 402 lays out the baseline for admission: “Rel-
evant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: 
the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court.”104 There are situations, however, in which rel-
evant evidence is deemed too prejudicial to reach a jury.105 Because non-DNA 
forensic evidence’s prejudicial effect on a jury substantially outweighs its pro-
bative value, this Note proposes adding a narrow special relevance rule ex-
cluding non-DNA forensic evidence in criminal trials under certain circum-
stances. This is not to say that non-DNA forensic evidence has zero probative 
101. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, Innocence Project, http://www.innocence
project.org/compensating-wrongly-convicted/ [https://perma.cc/R2L9-PGWC].
102. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 81, at 509–10 (2001) (describing the criminal justice sys-
tem as “a one-way ratchet that makes an ever-larger slice of the population felons” due to both 
public pressure and cooperation between legislators and prosecutors).
103. “On average, a public defender would need about 3,035 work hours—a year and a 
half—to do a year’s worth of work.” Jaeah Lee et al., Charts: Why You’re in Deep Trouble if You 
Can’t Afford a Lawyer, Mother Jones (May 6, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2013/05/public-defenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts [https://perma.cc/6KJ7-
CPV5]. See generally Carrie Dvorak Brennan, Note, The Public Defender System: A Comparative 
Assessment, 25 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 237 (2015).
104. Fed. R. Evid. 402.
105. For example, Rule 403 excludes evidence when the risk of unfair prejudice to the op-
posing party substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. As discussed infra, sev-
eral federal evidence rules categorically exclude highly prejudicial evidence with low probative 
value for certain purposes as a matter of law.
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value; for example, a fiber match may be able to tell you broad characteristics 
about that fiber, even if it cannot provide more specific information. But the 
prejudicial effect on criminal juries106 is simply too high a price to pay to war-
rant admission of this type of evidence absent better scientific grounding.
B. Rule 416: A New Special Relevance Rule
In light of the above discussion, this Note proposes a new rule barring 
prosecutors from introducing non-DNA forensic evidence absent either a 
competing defense expert or a high showing of scientific validity. This rule 
will ensure either that the jury has adequate context for the evidence or that 
the burden is placed on the proponent to prove that the evidence is scientifi-
cally valid.107 This Section argues that, as a matter of law, the risk of unfair 
prejudice from current non-DNA forensic evidence substantially outweighs 
its probative value, and that the interests of justice are not being served by 
allowing for judicial discretion regarding this type of evidence.
Balancing under Rule 403 already requires assessing the probative value 
of the evidence in question and then asking whether this probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the opposing 
party.108 As discussed above, the probative value of non-DNA forensic evi-
dence is low.109 Error rates are often not known, and when they are, they can 
be higher than we expect or should be comfortable with.110 Unlike DNA 
matching, these methods often cannot match a defendant to a crime scene. 
Rather, they often can only narrow the list of possible matches. In some cases, 
they cannot even do this.111
On the other hand, the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant created 
by non-DNA forensic evidence is extremely high. We have been attuned to 
the dangers of juries blindly believing experts since before the adoption of the 
revised Rule 702—ensuring the reliability of expert testimony that reaches ju-
ries is a key motivation for the rule itself.112 Add to this the credulous relation-
ship between juries and forensics, and even forensic testimony with 
106. See infra Section III.B.
107. While nominally the burden of proof for expert testimony does lie with the proponent 
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993), in practice the 
evidence is admitted absent an affirmative challenge from the opponent. See supra Section II.D. 
The proposed rule would require a threshold showing of validity from the proponent without 
requiring the opponent to object.
108. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
109. See supra Section II.A.
110. Recall that the error rate for fingerprint matching is potentially one in several hun-
dred. See supra Section II.A.
111. In bitemark comparison analysis, for example, forensic odontologists often cannot 
agree on whether a mark is a bite at all. See supra Table 1.
112. “Ever since experts have been testifying, courts and commentators have worried that 
judges and jurors, themselves lacking the relevant expertise, will be unable to distinguish genuine 
expertise from the external trappings of it.” Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is Expert 
Evidence Really Different?, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 13 (2013).
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appropriate jury instructions can have prejudicial effects.113 Often this testi-
mony comes in even without those caveats.114 Because forensic evidence is so 
prejudicial, the probative value would have to be extremely high for it to pass 
403 balancing. Indeed, this is why DNA matches pass muster under 403: the 
odds of a mistake are low, and the probative value of a DNA match is ex-
tremely high.115 We do not see that kind of probative value with non-DNA 
forensic evidence, and so, as a matter of law, the probative value we do see is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
To cabin judicial discretion to admit this type of evidence, this Note pro-
poses the following special relevance rule:
Rule 416: Non-DNA Forensic Evidence in Criminal Trials
(a) Definitions:
(1) “Non-DNA forensic evidence” shall include the results of a
comparative test meant to identify a suspect, to identify material 
relevant in a criminal proceeding, or to match material relevant in 
a criminal proceeding to a suspect, aside from results that pertain 
to the use of genetic material to identify a suspect.
(2) These tests include, but are not limited to: hair-match analysis, 
bitemark comparisons, ballistics matching, fingerprint matching, 
arson analysis, firearm identification, and toolmark identification.
(b) The prosecution shall not be permitted to introduce non-DNA fo-
rensic matching in criminal proceedings unless the method has gained 
acceptance in the relevant academic science community comparable to 
that enjoyed by DNA evidence for the purposes for which it is being 
admitted.
(c) Exception: The prosecution can introduce non-DNA forensic evi-
dence if the defense presents a competing expert speaking to the evi-
dence to be introduced.
In the absence of a competing defense expert to provide context to the 
jury, this rule bars the admission of hair match, bitemark, fiber analysis, and 
other similar test results until and unless proponents of this type of evidence 
can get credentialed scientists to conduct rigorous peer-reviewed studies 
demonstrating validity to a high degree of certainty. For many forensic tests—
for example, bitemark analysis—reaching this level of support is unlikely.116
113. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
114. See, for example, the systemic exaggerated testimony around hair match analysis dis-
cussed in notes 8–10 supra.
115. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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For others, such as fingerprints, additional testing could firm up the under-
standing of error rates.117 The goal here is to admit only evidence that reaches 
DNA-levels of reliability: liberty should not be restricted on the basis of less. 
This rule is limited to criminal proceedings, since as discussed above, the ad-
versarial process and judicial gatekeeping seem to function better in civil con-
texts,118 making outright exclusion unwarranted there. The list of examples 
provided in 416(a)(2) is not exhaustive and should be extended by analogy to 
exclude new forensic tests that have not yet reached the requisite level of evi-
dentiary support.
This proposed rule explicitly requires that the general acceptance compo-
nent of the inquiry be carried out with respect to academic science communi-
ties, not to groups of forensic science practitioners. The explicit reference to 
academic scientists in the rule permits challenges to forensic evidence only if 
the thinking in those communities changes and once-accepted methods be-
come discredited.
The inquiry into whether a forensic test has reached the threshold for ad-
mission will resemble the inquiry mandated by Daubert that has proved diffi-
cult to conduct. The difference is that the new rule requires an explicit com-
parison to the amount of testing, level of peer review, understanding of error 
rates, presence of standard maintenance, and level of general acceptance for 
DNA matching evidence, and so it gives judges an objective benchmark 
against which to evaluate the evidence in question. To guard against any judi-
cial tendency to claim reliability where there is none, appellate courts should 
review the admissions de novo. Requiring a default, intentionally high, thresh-
old showing from the proponent, intense scrutiny on appeal, and the existence 
of an actual objective benchmark should ensure greater rigor in the admission 
of problematic forensic testimony for the purposes of conviction. The defense 
is given considerably more latitude in evidence it can introduce to a jury, par-
allel to Rules 404(a)(2)(A)–(C) discussed below, because less reliable evidence 
may still introduce reasonable doubt.
C. Parallels in Existing Evidence Rules
All parts of this proposed rule have precedent in existing parts of the fed-
eral evidence code, and this rule is an extension of principles and concerns 
already at play in other parts of the code. While removing judicial discretion 
seems counter to the principles of a liberal evidence code, Congress has on 
multiple occasions decided to do precisely this.
Several evidence rules create different standards for civil and criminal 
contexts, with the understanding that criminal conviction carries with it seri-
ous penalties, including loss of life, restriction of liberty, 
117. PCAST Report, supra note 17, at 10.
118. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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disenfranchisement,119 and difficulty in obtaining employment.120 There is 
thus a recognition that evidentiary rules are sometimes different in criminal 
proceedings than in civil proceedings. For example, Rule 404(a)(2)(A)–(C)121
allows criminal defendants wider latitude in introducing certain types of char-
acter evidence than the government, with the understanding that character 
evidence may sow the seed of reasonable doubt. Similarly, Rule 803(8)(A)(ii) 
permits the admission of public records that otherwise would be considered 
hearsay, unless that record was made by a law enforcement officer under the 
duty to report in a criminal case. To preserve the defendant’s rights, that re-
port cannot be admitted without the officer present for cross-examination.122
The federal evidence code is familiar with making different rules for civil and 
criminal contexts, as the proposed Rule 416 would do.
Under Rule 410, evidence of pleas, plea discussions, and related state-
ments are not admissible except under narrow circumstances.123 The rationale 
behind this exclusion is in part to protect criminal defendants from what 
would be the admission of extremely prejudicial evidence against them (state-
ments made during plea negotiations) even though the probative value of 
these statements might be very high. The proposed new rule would bar simi-
larly prejudicial evidence that has a far lower likely probative value than state-
ments excluded under Rule 410; the goal of protecting criminal defendants is 
the same.
119. See, e.g., Felony Disenfranchisement, Sent’g Project, http://www.sentencingproject.
org/issues/felony-disenfranchisement/ [https://perma.cc/JUY6-W9NY].
120. See Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Dis-
crimination: A Field Experiment, 133 Q. J. Econ. 191 (2018).
121. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A) (allowing a criminal defendant to offer evidence of the 
defendant’s pertinent trait); Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(B) (allowing a criminal defendant to offer 
evidence of an alleged victim’s pertinent trait).
122. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(ii).
123. FED. R. EVID. 410:
(a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not admissible 
against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the plea discussions: (1) a 
guilty plea that was later withdrawn; (2) a nolo contendere plea; (3) a statement made 
during a proceeding on either of those pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11 or a comparable state procedure; or (4) a statement made during plea discussions with 
an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea 
or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.
(b) Exceptions. The court may admit a statement described in Rule 410(a)(3) or (4):
(1) in any proceeding in which another statement made during the same plea or 
plea discussions has been introduced, if in fairness the statements ought to be con-
sidered together; or (2) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement, if 
the defendant made the statement under oath, on the record, and with counsel pre-
sent.
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Likewise, there are several instances in the federal evidence code in which 
evidence fails 403 balancing as a matter of law. Rules 407,124 408,125 409,126 and 
411127 each categorically bar the admission of subsequent remedial measures, 
compromise offers and negotiations, offers to pay medical expenses, and the 
presence/absence of liability insurance, respectively, for the purposes of show-
ing liability (although this type of evidence is admissible for other purposes). 
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence chose to remove judicial discre-
tion in these instances; even relevant evidence is per se inadmissible for the 
purposes of showing liability. The prejudicial effect on juries is simply too high 
when weighed against the minimal probative value this evidence provides for 
the proscribed purposes.128
IV. Addressing Counterarguments
A. Limiting Instructions or Categorical Exclusion?
It has been argued that the evidence code should be more liberal with re-
spect to expert testimony, in that Daubert mandates the exclusion of expert 
124. FED. R. EVID. 407:
When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to 
occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove: negligence; cul-
pable conduct; a defect in a product or its design; or a need for a warning or instruction. 
But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment or—if 
disputed—proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.
125. FED. R. EVID. 408:
(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible—on behalf of any 
party—either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to im-
peach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or 
offering—or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept—a valuable considera-
tion in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a state-
ment made during compromise negotiations about the claim—except when offered in a 
criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public office in the exer-
cise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority. (b) Exceptions. The court 
may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or preju-
dice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution.
126. FED. R. EVID. 409: “Evidence of furnishing, promising to pay, or offering to pay med-
ical, hospital, or similar expenses resulting from an injury is not admissible to prove liability for 
the injury.”
127. FED. R. EVID. 411: “Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is 
not admissible to prove whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. But the 
court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice 
or proving agency, ownership, or control.”
128. For example, the presence of liability insurance often causes juries to worry about 
double recovery regardless of the actual presence or absence of liability; on the other hand, the 
probative value of whether or not a party had liability insurance for determining whether or not 
the party was negligent is not particularly high, since many non-negligent parties carry liability 
insurance. Fed. R. Evid. 411 advisory committee’s note to 1972 Proposed Rules.
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testimony that is more reliable than, say, eyewitness identification, which we 
know to be seriously problematic and which comes in with no problems under 
Rule 402.129 There is nothing special, this line of argument goes, about expert 
testimony justifying the higher standard for admission. The literature along 
these lines questions the prevalence of jury overvaluation of expert testimony 
as a reason for the heightened concern.130 It points to evidence that juries may 
view experts more as “hired guns” and argues that, generally, deference to ex-
perts is not irrational jury behavior.131 Regardless of whether or not there is 
empirical evidence showing that juries do not overvalue expert testimony gen-
erally, forensic evidence may be different: the expert testifying is not just any 
expert but often one with additional indicia of government authority. And 
given the state of some forensic evidence, assigning any value may be too 
much value.
Professor Richard Friedman argues that Daubert should be “squeezed out 
of the picture” and reliability replaced by other approaches to evidence admis-
sibility.132 He suggests that hair match analysis, although unreliable, still has 
enough probative value to be admitted with an instruction from the judge as 
to the proper weight133 as a “less restrictive” alternative to outright exclu-
sion.134 Given the problems detailed above, however, forensic evidence can be 
either “affirmatively misleading”135 or “of so little probative value as not to be 
worth the costs of presenting it”136 and should thus be excluded. This argu-
ment for exclusion can be made completely independent of the overvaluation 
concern that Friedman argues is overblown.137 The admission of forensic evi-
dence is often “wrong in a way that may be damaging to the search for 
truth,”138 and the evidence of this has only gotten stronger as we collect better 
data on exonerations.
Friedman makes the good point that the ideal process would be for courts 
of last resort to exclude misleading evidence as a matter of law,139 but since 
this is simply not happening, it would be wise to explore other options to 
129. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 112, at 8–10.
130. Id. at 13.
131. Id. at 13–16.
132. Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev.
1047, 1048 (2003). Friedman suggests that the bulk of evidence admissibility determinations be 
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solving the problem, including the use of legislatures instead of courts. Fried-
man also identifies exclusion of evidence as a potentially beneficial driving 
force for the improvement of such evidence,140 but the current system is not 
driving that improvement, either. Forcing the junk evidence to remain out 
until enough improvement takes place to increase its probative value signifi-
cantly will spur the development of better forensic tests. It is also worth noting 
that the proposed Rule 416, when combined with existing judicial behavior in 
civil contexts, would create Friedman’s preferred set of standards for expert 
evidence: “[s]tandards should be very lenient for criminal defendants, and 
tougher for prosecutors, with the standards for civil litigants somewhere in 
between.”141 This scale would be created by legislative rather than judicial ac-
tion.
B. Making It More Difficult to Secure Convictions
A central objection to the proposed Rule 416 is that it will make it ex-
tremely difficult to admit non-DNA forensic evidence and therefore make ob-
taining convictions of guilty defendants more difficult. This rule will make 
admitting junk science much more difficult in criminal trials. If the govern-
ment is concerned that courts are excluding relevant evidence, Congress and 
state legislatures are free to create financial incentives for academic science 
communities to test current forensic methods and develop new, more accu-
rate ones that can be admitted under the new rule. If evidence of reliability 
cannot be obtained through rigorous study, that forensic test should never be 
used to convict.
Another possible objection is that this rule will not be responsive enough 
to cutting-edge scientific developments. The response to this objection is two-
fold. First, once a forensic testing method reaches the level of scientific 
grounding and acceptance enjoyed by DNA matching, Congress can amend 
the rule and create an exception explicitly allowing it without the formality of 
the threshold showing of evidentiary support. In any case, the proposed rule 
itself would make an allowance for forensic testing methods that have proved 
their mettle.142 Second, while it would perhaps be preferable from an efficiency 
standpoint to have a judicially driven evolving standard for what is a reliable 
forensic-testing method rather than relying on the political branches, the last 
25 years have shown us that this is simply not a workable solution. Resource 
constraints on public defenders’ offices are not likely to ease in the near future. 
Forensic science laboratories are not likely to decouple from prosecutors’ of-
fices. Federal oversight of the science and the accreditation is likewise not 
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likely to be forthcoming.143 Reliance on the improvement of the evidence itself 
is likely misplaced, and the price we pay in improper convictions in the mean-
time is too high.
Conclusion
Regardless of the reasons for judges’ failure to exclude scientifically unac-
ceptable forensic evidence, giving the gatekeeping role to judges was probably 
overly burdensome to begin with.
It’s not like trial judges got together for a big celebration when Daubert came 
out,’ [U.S. District Court Judge Paul] Grimm said. ‘I am a judge because I 
didn’t understand science and math! If I could do science and math, I’d be 
Doctor so-and-so, not Judge so-and-so. That’s the reaction of judges in terms 
of dealing with these things.144
There is increasing recognition among judges that they need to be doing a 
better job at excluding evidence they, too, once thought was “infallible.”145 But 
a more efficient solution and one better suited to achieving justice would be 
to acknowledge the limitations of their training and cabin their discretion. Fo-
rensic evidence should not be admitted absent a showing that it enjoys as high 
reliability and acceptance among scientists as DNA match evidence, which is 
what the proposed Rule 416 would achieve. The destruction of lives, such as 
Santae Tribble’s, due to the irresponsible use of scientifically invalid evidence 
cannot continue in a system that values justice and accurate trial results.
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